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The relationship between arousal and depression has received 
more attention and elaboration in theoretical works than in research 
studies. Aaron Beck (1967) theorized that one's cognitive schema 
result in one constructing the experience, the self, and the future as 
negative and thereby causing the affective state of depression. Albert 
Ellis (1975) postulated similar cognitive functions in feelings of 
anxiety and depression. Stanley Schachter and others have demonstrated 
the labeling of arousal that goes on in euphoria and anger in their 
research, but their work did not extend to sadness and depression. 
Extending the theoretical implications of Schachter's work to depres-
sion, his idea that labeling a situation as depressing triggers arousal, 
corresponds to Beck's idea that the negative structuring of experience 
triggers depressive emotions. Schachter proposes the converse to be 
true also: the label of depression may be applied to arousal states on 
the basis of situational cues. Schachter's theory applied to depres-
sion may provide a somewhat broader explanation of the origins and 
chronicity of depression than Beck's theory and a rationale for many of 
the s.ymptoms Beck describes but does not explain. 
1 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPRESSION 
Beck (1967, 1974) classified depressive s.rmptoms in four 
categories: emotional, cognitive, motivational, and physical or 
vegetative. 
Emotional signs are painful dejection, loss of interest, loss 
of feelings of affection, self-dislike, crying spells, lack of enjoy-
ment, and loss of sense of humor (Beck, 1974; Freud, 1917; Ullmann and 
Krasner, 1969; Weiss, 1944). Most severely depressed ps,ychiatric 
patients report some degree of sadness or dejection, generally using 
such terms as "miserable," "blue," or "down-hearted." The dysphoric 
emotions can result from feelings of self-dislike, uselessness, or 
disappointment in the self. Depressed individuals fail to enjoy 
activities that they enjoyed previously, whether social, productive, or 
biological, and curtail their activities. Feelings of affection or 
enjoyment may be replaced by resentment, apathy, or boredom. Depressed 
individuals may not feel like laughing even though they perceive the 
punchline in jokes. 
Cognitive signs are loss of self-esteem, negative expectations, 
exaggerated view of problems, and attribution of blame to the self 
(Beck, 1974; Freud, 1917; Reese, 1971; Ullmann and Krasner, 1969). 
Cognitive signs represent distorted views of the self and world, so 
that the depressed individual feels inadequate and worthless and sees 
no possibility of future improvement. He may be unable to make 
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decisions because he anticipates making the wrong choice. He tends in 
general to blame adverse experiences on his own defeciencies. 
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Motivational signs are increased dependency, loss of motivation, 
avoidance, indecisiveness, and suicidal wishes (Beck, 1974; Ullmann and 
Krasner, 1969). A depressed person wishes to escape demands on his· 
energy, perhaps to the point of suicide. Increased dependency is mani-
fested by a desire for help. 
Physical and vegetative signs are loss of appetite, sleep 
disturbance, fatigability, loss of sexual interest, and inhibition of 
activity (Beck, 1974; Ullmann and Krasner, 1969; Weiss, 1944). Sad 
facial expressions, slow movement, less speech or, conversely, inces-
sant activity and restlessness may characterize the depressed individual. 
He may lose interest in food or sex or be unable to sleep and tire 
easily. 
The pattern of s.ymptoms varies from person to person, and 
people who are not clinically depressed but merely experiencing mood 
swings may exhibit some of them. Those signs most often mentioned in 
the literature seem to be the emotional signs which describe affect. 
MODELS OF DEPRESSION 
Ps.ychodynarnic Model 
Psychodynamic theories attribute depression to the loss of a 
loved object or the loss of self-esteem (Wilkins, 1971). Freud (1917) 
saw it as an imaginary, feared, or vaguely perceived loss that deprived 
the ego. The loss in depression was that part of the loved object 
which was incorporated into the ego. Freud compared depression to grief 
because he thought that both involve loss of a loved object but differ-
entiated them in that the loss was obvious and external in grief but in 
depression was an ego function and, therefore, unobservable. A more 
concrete description of the process of feared loss of the loved object 
comes from Hill (1947). He traced the onset of depression as follows: 
the individual with a depression-prone personality unconsciously charms 
another until it seems that a healthy, affectionate, reciprocal rela-
tionship has developed. The depression-prone personality then escalates 
his demands insatiably and expresses increasing disapproval as they are 
frustrated. The resultant rage is inhibited to prevent losing the loved 
object completely or provoking the superego. The inhibited rage arouses 
the anxiety (fear) of losing the loved object and guilt (punishment by 
the superego for becoming enraged). 
Others considered the loss more real than imagined. Rado (1928) 
believed that the loss of a loved object resulted in a loss of self-
esteem in persons with a precarious self-concept and narcissistic need 
for approval. Depression and self-vilification were punishment of the 
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ego by the superego and attempts at expiation undertaken in order to win 
back love. Bibring (1953) also theorized that the loss of self-esteem 
causing depression could result from frustrated-needs for love and 
affection but added that it could result from frustration of other needs 
as well. He saw depression as the expression of the awareness of the 
ego of its helplessness or powerlessness. Jacobson (1953, 1954) and 
Klein (1948) also theorized that loss of self-esteem and depression 
resulted from frustration and lack of gratification. 
Abraham (1911, 1916. 1924) saw depression as a real or feared 
loss of an object of gratification but concentrated less on the loss 
than the feelings of hostility toward the loved object which undermined 
the depressive individual's capacity for affection. The ambivalence of 
feelings about the object choice was also directed toward the part of 
the ego which represented the object; that is, the hostility directed 
against the ego in the form of self-accusation was another m~nifestation 
of the hostility toward the loved object. 
In general, frustration of a need, whether for love or achieve-
ment, results in an ego loss and depression follows as a reaction. The 
feelings of hostility toward a loved object that has been lost are 
likely to alienate that object further and escalate the guilt that the 
depressive individual feels due to his hostility. PS,Ychoanalytic 
interpretations of depression concentrate on internal factors and tend 
to ignore environmental influence. 
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Behavioral Model 
Behaviorists attribute depression to a decrease in reinforcement 
(Wilkins, 1971). Ferster (1965) proposed that any change resulting in a 
relative inability to acquire positive reinforcers could produce a 
depression. He asserted that the loss of a "significant other" causes a 
sudden reduction in behavioral output and consequently a reduced rate of 
positive reinforcement. A depressive person seems to be especially 
vulnerable to the loss of a loved person or object because of the 
tendency Ferster observed to restrict the number of persons with whom 
they interact. Lazarus (1968) published case studies which supported 
the association of a depressed state with a lack of positive reinforce-
ment. Removing reinforcers from an individual' s environment brought on 
depression while increasing the individual's ability to acquire addi-
tional reinforcers alleviated depression. He proposed that depressions 
which could not be explained by learning theory are probably of organic 
origin. 
Either personal characteristics or environmental factors may 
cause the low reinforcement rate (Lewinsohn, Shaffer, and Libet, 1969; 
Patterson and Rosenberry, cited in Beck, 1974). For example, depressive. 
persons may lack social skills and, therefore, have fewer sources of 
available .reinforcement, experience greater deprivation from loss of a 
source, or find it more difficult to replace a lost reinforcer. A 
change in the individual's role status, as in aging, may result in 
previously reinforced behavior no longer being reinforced and conse-
quently in depression (Ullmann and Krasner, 1969). Kanfer (1971) 
proposed that self-reinforcement tends to match previous external 
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reinforcement serving to maintain behavior. Such a tendency would serve 
to perpetuate depressive moods. 
In general terms, presentation of a reinforcer increases the 
strength of a response while the removal or loss of a reinforcer 
decreases its strength. Thus reduction in reinforcers could produce-
avoidance behavior and inactivity further reducing the possibility of 
reinforcement. Lewinsohn, et al (1969) asserted that depressive 
behavior alienates other people~ This would further reduce ~he number 
of positive reinforcers and contribute to the continuation of the 
depressive cycle. Since behaviorists prefer to deal with external 
behaviors and ~void discussing internal and unobservable affective 
states, they neglect subjective components of depression such as 
feelings of sadness or hopelessness and suicidal wishes. Behavior 
theory has been applied only to limited aspects of depression. 
Cognitive Model 
Beck (1967, 1974) posits a set of three major cognitive patterns 
which cause the disturbances in depression. 
The first component is the construction of experience in a 
negative way such that life seems to be filled with defeat, deprivation, 
and disparagement. This is a selective interpretation which transforms 
neutral or ambiguous situations into self-deflating ones through 
inaccuracies and misinterpretations which focus on the most negative 
aspects of the situation. The depressed person is likely to set high 
standards for himself and any falling short of these standards is 
perceived as total failure. He is likely to feel substantially 
deprived by relatively trivial. events whether in terms of money, time, 
or self-esteem, and to feel the loss most keenly in comparing himself 
with other people who seem more fortunate. He is also likely to inter-
pret neutral or even favorable remarks by others as disparaging or to 
feel that other people have derogatory ideas about him. 
The second component of depression is a negative view of the 
self as deficient, inadequate, and unworthy. Unpleasant experiences 
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are attributed to defects in the self which leads to feelings of 
worthlessness and self-rejection. The depressed person tends to over-
generalize from a particular behavior to a character trait, to interpret 
a minor variation in performance as a major shortcoming on which he 
bases his entire self-concept. He defines himself in terms of this 
deficiency and then rejects himself for it. 
The third component is a negative view of the future such that 
current difficulties seem to continue indefinitely. The depressed 
person tends to be preoccupied with thoughts of the future, generally 
as an extension of his view of the present. Both long and short-range 
forecasts are of a similar negative nature--anticipation of failure 
accompanied by feelings of the impossibility of feeling better and the 
futility of trying. 
The affective state is regarded as the consequence of the way 
the individual views himself or his environment. The depressed person 
perceives his behavior as involving failure or loss and consequently 
feels sad or apathetic. His reaction may be based on faulty interpreta-
tion of available data such that new information is distorted to fit the 
negative conceptualization ~ather than modifying the concept to fit the 
new information. Thus the affect remains negative. 
Motivation is likewise seen as the consequence of cognition. 
Motivation to perform some action depends on cognitions about the 
likelihood of success and possible benefits. Motivational changes in 
depression such as paralysis of will, escapist and avoidance wishes, 
suicidal wishes, and intensified dependency wishes are responses to 
changes in cognitions about the self and the world as negative. 
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Briefly, the cognitive model states that the person first thinks 
he is bad and worthless and then feels depressed. The content of the 
person's cognitions is derived from the individual's past experiences, 
a generalization relating to the individual's goals, values, and 
attitudes. 
SCHACHTER' S THEORY OF EMOTION 
Stanley Schachter has developed a theory of emotion stressing 
the interaction of two components--physiological arousal and cognitions 
about the situation. In initial research he assumed that emotion is an 
interaction of arousal of the s.rmpathetic nervous s.ystem and the 
cognitions explaining the arousal. Schachter and Singer ( 1962) found 
that euphoric or angry behavior and emotions were adopted by a subject 
from a stooge showing such behaviors provided that the subject was 
injected with epinephrine rather than a placebo and provided that he was 
not informed about the possible physiological effects of the drug. 
Subjects who were ignorant of the drug's effects were more likely to 
attribute their arousal to the situation and participate in the stooge's 
unusual actions. A problem with the method was that placebos do not 
block ordinary arousal, so that a subject could become angry or euphoric 
from the situation alone. Use of epinephrine, chlorpromazine (a tran-
quilizer), and a placebo in an amusing situation overcame this difficul-
ty (Schachter and Wheeler, 1962). The tranquilizer served to prevent 
normal arousal and the epinephrine to produce more than normal arousal. 
Once again the subject's behavioral response and ratings of the funni-
ness of the movie depended on both the drug he received and the type of 
information he had as to its possible effects. Those who failed to 
associate arousal symptoms with the drug acted and described themselves 
as more emotional in the staged situations. Nisbett and Schachter 
(1966) used shock instead of drugs to produce arousal and used a placebo 
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described as arousal-producing as the contrived situation. In this 
case, subjects who associated arousal ~mptoms with the drug rather than 
the shock tolerated higher levels of shock than those who associated 
arousal ~mptoms with the shock itself. In all these cases, arousal was 
attributed to whatever element of the total situation seemed most 
salient: a drug, a movie, or another person's behavior. 
According to Kelley's theory of attribution {1967), attribution 
is the process of attaining cognitive mastery of the causal structure of 
the environment, or, more simply, the process of deciding why events 
occur either in the environment or in oneself. In the basic case in 
which the person is trying to disentangle the effects of the stable 
features of his surrounding environment, the choice is between external 
and internal attribution. External attribution is the decision that the 
effect is a result of the surrounding environment, and internal attribu-
tion is the decision that the effect results from the self, Attribution 
to the external stimulus rather than to the self requires that the 
subject responds differentially to the stimulus, consistently, and in 
consensus with other people's responses. The subject in Schachter's 
research, however, is involved in a unique, one-shot situation, and his 
information is limited to that which the experimenter and stooge·give 
him and what he can figure out on his own. The more consistent the 
information is, the more stable the attribution should be. The sub-
ject's basic information is that he is aroused in this situation, 
whereas he is not aroused all the time, and if he believes the injection 
to be vitamins, there is no internal event, so that he attributes his 
arousal to an external source rather than himself. If the experimenter 
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informs him that the injection he has received will produce arousal 
symptoms, he is likely to accept this explanation because it is consist-
ent and look upon the stooge's actions as unusual but discount the 
effect of those actions on himself. If, however, the subject is 
misinformed or ignorant about the drug's effects, he will seek informa-
tion that is consistent with his feelings, information which the stooge 
handily provides. Another element which comes into play is the trust-
worthiness of the informant. The subject may decide that the drug has 
caused his arousal, despite the fact that the experimenter has failed to 
inform him or has misinformed him of the drug's effects. This did occur 
in the Schachter and Singer study and was called a "self-informing 
tendency" on the part of some subjects. Additionally the subject might 
have suspected the stooge of some ~terior motive and, therefore, 
refused to accept his definition of the situation as euphoric or angry. 
Attribution in Schachter's studies consisted of the subjects looking at 
the total information they had about the situation, cognitively deciding 
which element seemed most consistent with his subjective feeling of 
arousal, and labeling that element as the cause. 
Schachter discussed his own research and that of others about 
arousal and emotion in terms of labeling (1964). Verbal descriptions by 
those experiencing emotional situations without arousal (because of 
spinal cord lesions) and drug-induced arousal in a non-emotional 
situation both contain an "as if" quality. Persons with spinal cord 
lesions report that they act "as if" they are upset but do not truly 
feel emotional in situations which were emotion-arousing before their 
injury. Persons injected with adrenalin described themselves as 
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feeling "as if" they were emotional but that they really were not. 
Furthermore, pot smokers had to learn that the sensations associated 
with pot-smoking highs were pleasurable before they began to enjoy 
smoking, and children learned from their mothers to confuse the 
sympathetic arousal of intense emotional situations with hunger. All 
these situations involve labeling sensations appropriate to the specific 
situation. 
Schachter and Latan~ (1964) studied the effects of arousal on 
avoidance learning in two groups--nor,mal persons and sociopathic ones. 
Earlier research on animals showed poor avoidance learning for both very 
high and very low levels of arousal. The best avoidance learning 
occurred at moderate levels of arousal (Latan~ and Schachter, 1962; 
Wynne and Solomon, 1955). Singer (1963) found that the amount of 
emotional behavior displayed by both rats and humans was a direct 
function of the degree of arousal. This may explain the results of the 
animal studies; too little arousal probably means the subject is not 
paying attention to the task while too much arousal seems to produce 
emotional behavior that interferes with the task. Schachter and 
Latan~ chose sociopaths for research because, as a group, they show 
little guilt (arousal) and fail to profit from unpleasant experience 
(avoidance learning). On a four-choice maze with one correct and one 
shocked alternative, normal and sociopathic subjects learned e~ually 
well the positively reinforced task. However, the normal subjects 
learned the avoidance task much better than the sociopaths. When 
adrenalin was administered to both groups, the results were reversed. 
Presumably, the high arousal produced in normal subjects interfered with 
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learning the avoidance task. One would also presume that since the 
sociopaths learned more easily, the adrenalin must have increased their 
ordinarily low levels of arousal to a moderate level which facilitated 
learning. Furthermore, high autonomic reactivity is associated with 
either very low anxiety and emotionality, as in the case of sociopaths, 
or very high anxiety and emotionality, as in the case of anxiety 
neurotics. Schachter emphasizes the importance of cognitive labeling of 
high autonomic reactivity. He feels that sociopaths exhibit indiscrimi-
nant reactivity to all events, so that they fail to apply a cognitive 
label of emotion while anxiety neurotics label all events emotional and 
therefore trigger autonomic activity. 
If Schachter's theory of emotion is applied to depression, it 
corresponds somewhat to Beck's cognitive theory of depression. Beck 
proposes cognitive schema which construct the experience, the self, and 
the future as negative and cause the affective state of depression 
(1967, 1974). This appears to correspond to Schachter's proposal that a 
person may label events as depressing and trigger autonomic activity. 
However, Schachter's theory might further propose that a person may 
experience arousal and define it as depression because the situation 
contains cues for depression. Research has not explored this aspect. 
This interaction allows more flexibility in explaining the origins of 
depressive states as well as providing a rationale for chronic depres-
sion. One who is chronically depressed may have learned to label most 
arousal states as depression, just as the children mentioned previously 
learned to label intense emotions a hunger. Additionally such a person 
may learn to label himself negatively, and this stable negative 
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self-image may trigger a more or less permanent state of arousal. 
Prolonged s.rmpathetic activity could account for many of the s.rmptoms of 
depression such as work inhibition, sleep disturbance, fatigue, irrita-
bility, and somatic preoccupation that represent interference with 
normal behavior patterns. Schachter's theory of emotion is able to 
account for the origins, maintenance, and.a number of symptom patterns 
of depression. 
MEASUREMENTS OF DEPRESSION 
In measuring depression, it was necessary to find separate 
instruments directed toward state and trait depression. The trait 
depression measure is needed for determining long-term, stable tenden-
cies toward depressed affect, the basis for dividing subjects into 
groups of high and low trait depression. The state depression measure 
should be capable of discriminating temporary changes in mood before and 
after treatment conditions. Beck's Depression Inventory (1967) and the 
MMPI-D scale (1960) are examples of trait depression measures, and 
Lubin's Depression Adjective Check Lists (1967) is a state depression 
measure. 
The MMPI-D scale is one of ten scales developed b,y Hathaway and 
McKinley (1967) from a pool of 1000 purposely vague statements. The 
items were administered to groups of normal adults, college students, 
and p~chiatric patients with instructions to indicate which items 
applied to them and which did not. Data analysis reduced the number of 
items to 566, and ten scales were derived from the subjects' patterns of 
responses to these items. Most of the 60 items in the D scale were 
selected through comparison of normals and a group of depressed p~chi­
atric patients. A number of items were introduced to minimize eleva-
tions on the D scale for p~chiatric cases whose primary diagnosis was 
not depression (Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom, 1972). Test-retest 
reliability of the D scale is 0.80 for male p~chiatric cases. Validity 
in terms of agreement with ratings of depression by staff members ranges 
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between 0.51 and 0.61. The D scale does have drawbacks in that it is 
not a pure measure of depression. Several studies have indicated that 
there are approximately five clusters in the D scale including hostility 
and anxiety, though the difficulty in differentiation seems to be a 
function of paper-and-pencil measures in general. D scores measure not 
only depressive feelings but associated physical feelings as well 
(Costello and Comrey, 1967). 
Beck's method of scale construction began with the s.ymptoms 
integral to depression and the construction of categories including a 
· series of statements reflecting varying degrees of severity. (1967). 
Scores represented a combination of the number of s.ymptoms endorsed and 
their severity. The items do not reflect any theory of etiology or 
underlying ps.ychological process. Beck observed and recorded character-
istic attitudes and s.ymptoms which appeared to be specific to depressed 
patients and which were consistent with descriptions of depression 
contained in the ps.ychiatric literature. From these possibilities, he 
used 21 categories, each describing a specific behavioral manifestation 
of depression and consisting of a graded series of four or five evalua-
tive statements. The statements are ranked on a continuum from neutral 
to maximum severity and assigned a numerical value to indicate severity. 
In some categories, two of the statements are equivalent and receive the 
same numerical weight. The categories were: 
L Mood 9· Suicidal wishes 
2. Pessimism 10. Crying spells 
3· Sense of failure 11. Irritability 4. Lack of satisfaction 12. Social withdrawal 
5· Guilty feelings 13. Indecisiveness 6. Sense of punishment 14. Distortion of body image 
7· Self-dislike 15. Work inhibition 
8. Self-accusations 16. Sleep disturbance 
r 
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17. Fatigability 20. Somatic preoccupation 
18. Loss of appetite 21. Loss of libido 
19. Weight loss 
The inventory was administered to new inpatient and outpatient ps.ychia-
tric hospital admissions, either direc~ly before or directly after an 
interview with a ps.ychiatrist. The ps.ychiatrists rated each patient 
globally for depth of depression as well as on specific indices repre-
senting the pooled experience of the clinicians. These ratings agreed 
within one degree on the four point scale in 97% of the cases. Split-
half reliability was 0.93 for 97 cases. Correlations between inventory 
scores and clinical ratings ranged between 0.61 and 0.67 for several 
studies of validity. 
Lubin (1967) culled a pool of adjectives connoting varying 
degrees of depression and elation from dictionaries, books of s.ynonyms, 
etc. The items were administered to groups of normal women and severely 
depressed ps.ychiatric patients. Item analysis identified 171 items that 
discriminated among the two groups and that were subsequently divided 
into four lists of similar differentiating power. The same process was 
carried out with groups of normal and depressed males yielding a smaller 
number of discriminating items divided into three lists. Lubin felt 
that these differences reflected culturally conditioned differences in 
self-reporting (1965). Split-half reliability on the lists ranged 
between 0.82 and 0.93 for normals and 0.86 and 0.93 for patients. 
Correlations between lists range from 0.80 to 0.93, so that the lists 
may be considered equivalent. Cross-validation on new groups found 
significant differences in scores for groups of normals, non-depressed 
patients, and depressed patients. Correlations with MMPI-D and Beck 
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Inventory scores ranged between 0.25 and 0.66, all of which are signifi-
cant. The final lists have 22 positively scored adjectives and 10 
negatively scored adjectives on the female lists and 22 positively and 
12 negatively scored adjectives on the male lists. A major criticism is 
that the DACL measures other affective states than depression including 
fatigue, lack of vigor, bewilderment, and unfriendliness (McNair, 1972). 
This criticism is similar to that of the MMPI-D. 
METHODS OF PRODUCING AROUSAL 
A common method of inducing arousal is by injection of drugs 
such as adrenalin and epinephrine. For example, Schachter and Singer 
(1962), Schachter and Wheeler (1962), and Singer (1963) used drugs, 
which produced arousal, and placebos,· which controlled for any effects 
of the actual injection. Frankenhaeuser, Jarpe, Svan, and Wrangsjo 
(1963) used placebos alone tu produce arousal s.ymptoms. Frankenhaeuser, 
Post, Hagdahl, and Wrangsjoe (1964) used placebos in producing depres-
&ve symptoms also. Schachter anu Latan~ (1964) used drugs and electric 
shock. The threat of shock produced arousal which facilitated avoidance 
learning in normal subjects; whereas drugs were necessary to produce the 
same effects in sociopaths. Shock was also used by Nisbett and Schach-
ter (1966) to produce pain and arousal while a placebo was perceived by 
subjects as a source of some of their arousal symptoms. 
Ego threats are a third method of producing arousal. Valins and 
Ray (1967) used subjects who were afraid of snakes, a natural threat, to 
illustrate that cognitions about internal states are important to 
systematic desensitization procedures. Subje~ts given false feedback 
that indicated that they were not internally aroused by snake stimuli 
showed more approach behavior when confronted by a live snake. Dienst-
bier and Munter (1971) and Schachter and Ono (cited in Schachter and 
Latan~, 1964) ·took a different tack with students, implying that the 
results of the test they took as part of the experiment were vital to 
their success in school. Dienstbier and Munter used placebo drugs~ 
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saying that they were responsible for arousal symptoms. Schachter and 
Ono used chlorpromazine to reduce arousal ~mptoms. In both cases 
subjects who were drugged, or who believed they were, cheated more on 
th~ tests because they felt less aroused by the test or attributed more 
of their arousal to the drug. 
Drugs may be a more common method of inducing arousal because 
they are more certain of producing arousal than ego threats and less 
obviously noxious than shock. Some subjects may be so afraid of either 
shock or injection that they may refuse to participate in the experi-
ment. Ego threats are better from this standpoint, but they are more 
difficult to control--what is threatening to some subjects may not be to 
others. The best results are likely to be obtained with a preselected 
group such as Valins and Ray, whose group was college freshmen who can 
be expected to be concerned with success in college. Placebos are not 
used directly in producing arousal to any great extent but are often 
used in conjunction with other methods, either as control or as fake 
treatment. Selection of a means of producing arousal depends on the 
group on which it is to be used and the context of its use. 
HYPOTHESES 
In order to look at the relationship between arousal and depres-
sion, the present experimental study was designed to explore the follow-
ing hypotheses: 
1) Individuals with high levels of trait depression will 
exhibit higher scores on the state measure of depression than those with 
low levels of trait depression. 
2) Levels of depression will interact with the type of instruc-
tions given for the drug's effects, so that a) individuals with high 
levels of trait depression will show increases on the state measure when 
given stimulant instructions, b) individuals with low levels of trait 
depression will show no change on this measure, and c) neither group 
will show changes in state depression when given quiescent instructions. 
3) Individuals with high levels of trait depression will be 
less persistent in attempting additional mazes than those with low 
levels of trait depression. 
4) Levels of trait depression will interact with the type of 
instructions given for the drug's effects, so that a) individuals with 
high levels of trait depression and stimulant instructions will attempt 
fewer mazes than those with low levels of trait depression and stimulant 
instructions, b) individuals with high or low levels of trait depression 
and quiescent instructions will show no difference in the number of 
mazes attempted, and c) individuals with high trait depression and 
stimulant instructions will attempt fewer mazes than those with high 
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2) 
levels of trait depression given quiescent instructions. 
5) Individuals who receive stimulant instructions will admit to 
more arousal than those who receive quiescent instructions. 
METHODS 
Subjects 
Subjects were 40 students from introductory p~chology classes 
at Loyola University. Students participate in research as partial 
fulfillment of course requirements. Half the subjects were male, half 
female. 
Subjects were pretested with the MMPI-D and the Beck scales. 
They were divided into groups on the basis of high or low scores on both 
tests, using a median split for the MMPI-D. D scale means were 69.4 for 
depressed subjects and 44.2 for non-depressed subjects. No subject in 
either the depressed or non-depressed groups reached the standard cutoff 
on the Beck scale, but the mean score of the depressed group was 2.6 
while the mean score of the non-depressed group was 0.6. Half the males 
and half the females were classified as having high levels of trait 
depression and the other half as having low levels of trait depression. 
Tests 
Three paper-and-pencil measures of depression were used. The 
first, Beck's Depression Inventory, is a 13 item questionnaire in which 
the subject is instructed to select the response of four alternatives 
that best describes his present attitudes. This measure is thought to 
measure both state and trait aspects of depression. 
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The second measure, the MMPI-D scale, consists of 60 items which 
the subject is instructed to answer either true or false as they apply 
to him. This test is primarily a measure of trait depression. 
The Depression Adjective Check Lists (DACL) consist of 32 or 34 
self-descriptive adjectives depending on the form used. Subjects are 
instructed to check off each adjective which the respondent regards as 
descriptive of "how you feel now--today." 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was simple, consisting of a sophisticated-looking 
EEG machine with two electrodes. The machine emitted a pre-recorded 
audible beep. 
Procedures 
Subjects were pretested with the MMPI-D and the Beck scales In 
a placebo "drug" and biofeedback technique, subjects were given a pill 
to take and told that the ''drug" was being tested for its effects on 
concentration. Possible side effects of the placebo were described. 
Half the subjects then received a description of arousal side effects 
such as faster heart rate, sweating palms, butterflies in the stomach, 
and increased galvanic skin response. The other half received a de-
scription of side effects of boredom or quiescence such as relaxed 
muscles, sleepiness, slower heart rate, and decreased GSR. Subjects 
were then connected to a "biofeedback" machine by fake electrodes 
attached to the back of the neck and the forehead and instructed to 
concentrate on a complex visual pattern in front of them. After the 
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electrodes were attached, all subjects heard an audible beep signal that 
had been pre-recorded on tape but appeared to come from the "biofeedback., 
machine. They were told the signal indicated that the electrodes 
attached were picking up changes in the neural activity associated with 
the effects of the drug and transmitting them to the biofeedback 
machine. This was purported to demonstrate the drug's effects on the 
subject's concentration. 
The experimental task consisted of a series of complex mazes 
administered to all subjects. The subje~ts were told to solve the mazes 
as quickly as possible and were given a very short time limit within 
which to do this. The first three demonstration mazes were relatively 
less complex than later mazes and they were easily solvable. The 
experimenter demonstrated the proper solution to any subject who was 
unable to solve it alone. Later mazes were unsolvable, however, and the 
time limit was intended to prevent subjects from discovering this fact. 
The mazes were administered in quick succession and were intended to 
produce a failure experience. In the intertrial interval on later mazes 
subjects received verbal feedback which became increasingly negative, 
beginning with "Let' s try· another since you couldn't solve that one., 
after the fourth maze to "You haven't done well at all so far" after the 
seventh maze with a final statement of the number of mazes the subject 
solved with the remark that the score is rather low. 
The DACL was given three times: once as pretest, immediately 
after the biofeedback, and after administration of the mazes. Subjects 
wereal.,so asked to rate their subjective level of arousal at these times 
and once again at the end of the testing.· 
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After the last administration of the DACL, a second series of 12 
mazes was made available, the total number of whicq attempts was to be a 
measure of persistence. Subjects were told that they would be given a 
chance to work more mazes of the same type with the same time limit in 
order to try to develop a better strategy of solving the mazes. Sub-
jects were told that the experimenter would like their cooperation but 
that they did not have to if they did not want to work further mazes. 
Finally the subjects were thoroughly debriefed as to the nature 
and purpose of the experiment and the deceptions involved. They were 
cautioned not to reveal this knowledge to others. 
Design 
The DACL was analyzed by a 2x2x2x3 ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the fourth variable. The variables of interest are high and low 
levels of trait depression, arousal and non-arousal instructions, sex, 
and the three administrations of the DACL. There were 10 males with 
high trait depression, 10 males with low trait depression, 10 females 
with high trait depression, and 10 females with low trait depression. 
Persistence was operationalized as the number of mazes attempted. This 
data was analyzed by a 2x2x2 ANOVA with high and low levels of depres-
sion, arousal and non-arousal instructions, and sex as the variables. 
Subjective arousal as indicated Qy self-report was analyzed by a 2x2x2x4 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable. The variables of 
interest are high and low levels of trait depression, arousal and non-
arousal instructions, sex, and the four administrations of self-report 
of arousal. 
RESULTS 
Depression Adjective Check Lists 
The first dependent variable was· the number of dysphoric adjec-
tives endorsed by each subject on the Depression Adjective Check Lists 
at pretest (Time 1), after the feedback (Time 2), and after the first 
set of mazes (Time J). Scores on the DACL.were subjected to a 2x2x2x3 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable. The variables of 
interest were sex, high and low trait depression, stimulant and quies-
cent drug effect instructions, and time. The mean number of dysphoric 
adjectives endorsed by subjects on the DACL is presented in Table 1. 
High trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to exhibit 
higher scores on state depression measures than low trait-depressed 
individuals. A main effect for trait depression was found, F(1, 96)= 
5.53, p<.02, reflecting a mean of 2.08 for the high depression group and 
1.21 for the low depression group. The interaction of Depression X Time 
was not significant, F(2, 96)=0.)2, p=N.S. 
A Depression X Instruction X Time interaction was hypothesized 
in which stimulant instructions would produce increasing DACL scores for 
high trait-depressed subjects but no change for low trait-depressed 
subjects. Quiescent instructions would result in no change for either 
group. The Depression X Instruction X Time interaction effect was not 
significant, F(2, 96)=0.45, p=N.S. Although means for the stimulant 
instructions were in the direction predicted, 1.40, 1.70, and 2.90, 
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Table 1 
Mean Number of Uysphoric Adjectives Endorsed by Subjects on DACL 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Depressed Males 1.80 1.80 2.60 
Depressed Females 1.00 1.60 ).20 
Stimulant 
Non-depressed Males 0.40 0.60 1.40 
Instructions 
Non-depressed Females 1.00 0.80 0.80 
Totals 1.05 1.20 2.00 
Depressed Males 0.4o 2.40 3.00 
Depressed Females 3-20 2.60 1.40 
Quiescent 
Non-depressed Males 0.80 1.00 2.40 
Instructions 
Non-depressed Females 2.4o 1.60 1.40 
Totals 1.70 1.90 2.05 
Overall Totals 1.38 1.55 2.03 
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respectively, for depressed subjects and 0.70, 0.70, and 1.10 for non-
depressed subjects, with quiescent instructions DAC~ scores fluctuated 
unevenly in opposite directions for the high and low trait-depressed 
groups. Means for high trait-depressed groups were 0.80, 2.50, and 2.20 
under quiescent instructions, and means for low trait-depressed groups 
were 1.60, 1.30, and 1.90. Other interactions in the analysis did not 
reach significance. 
Persistence 
The second dependent variable was the number of the second set 
of mazes attempted. Scores were subjected to a 2x2x2 ANOVA. The varia-
bles of interest were sex, depression, and instructions. The mean 
number of extra mazes attempted by subjects is presented in Table 2. 
Subjects with high trait-depression were hypothesized to attempt 
fewer mazes than those with low trait-depression. Depressed subjects 
attempted slightly more mazes (x~4.95) than non-depressed subjects 
(X~.80), but the main effect of depression was non-significant, 
F(1, 32)~0.02, ~N.S. 
A Depression X Instruction interaction was Qypothesized such 
that under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects would attempt 
fewer mazes than non-depressed subjects and under quiescent instructions, 
the depressed and non-depressed groups would not differ in the numbe+ of 
mazes attempted. The Depression X Instruction effect was non-signifi-
cant, F(1, 32)~1.99, ~N.S., and only partly in the expected direction. 
Under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects attempted fewer mazes 
(x~3.80) than non-depressed subjects (X=5.30) as predicted, but under 
Table 2 
Mean Number of Extra Mazes Attempted by Subjects 
Stimulant Quiescent 
Instructions Instructions 
Depressed Males J.6o .s.so 
Depressed Females 4.00 6.40 
Non-depressed Males .s.oo 4.40 
Non-depressed Females 5.60 4.20 
Totals 4 • .5.5 .5.20 
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quiescent instructions, rather than doing an equal number of mazes, 
depressed subjects did more mazes (X=6.10) than non-depressed subjects 
(X=4.30). 
Subjective Feelings of Arousal 
The third dependent variable was the subject's estimate of his 
own arousal based on a scale "from one to ten, in which one is so 
relaxed that you're about to fall asleep and ten is so nervous that 
you're about to jump out of your skin." Scores were subjected to a 
2x2x2x4 ANOVA with repeated measures on the fourth variable. Times 1, 
2, and 3 for this measure are the same as for the DACL. Time 4 was 
after the second set of mazes. Variables of interest were sex, depres-
sion, instructions, and time. 
It was hypothesized that subjects receiving stimulant instruc-
tions would admit to more arousal than subjects receiving quiescent 
instructions. The main effect for instructions was non-significant 
though in the expected direction, F(1, 121)=1.59, p=N.S. The mean for 
stimulant instructions was 5.18 and for quiescent instructions was 4.81. 
Another effect approaching significance was the Depression X 
Instruction interaction, F(1, 121)=3.21, p<.08. Under quiescent in-
structions depressed subjects reported more arousal (X=5.03) than non-
depressed subjects (X=4.58), and under stimulant instructions depressed 
subjects reported less arousal (X=4.88) than non-depressed subjects 
(X=5.48). 
DISCUSSION 
The only hypothesis which was unequivocally supported is the one 
proposing that subjects with high levels of trait depression will exhib-
it higher scores on the state measure of depression than those with low 
levels of trait depression. The MMPI-D scale was used to measure trait 
depression or long-term, stable tendencies toward depressed affect. The 
DACL was used to measure state depression, that is, temporary changes in 
mood. Subjects classified as trait-depressed by relatively higher 
scores on the MMPI-D claimed more depressed feelings on the three admin-
istrations of the DACL as well, although the changes over time in DACL 
scores were less pronounced than expected. The DACL may be a less 
responsive measure than anticipated in terms of discriminating temporary 
changes in depressed affect among the subjects used in this study. Both 
these measures have drawbacks in that neither is a pure measure of 
depression. The MMPI-D taps anxiety, hostility, and physical factors as 
well as depression while the DACL includes fatigue, lack of vigor, 
bewilderment, and unfriendliness in its score. Despite these difficul-
ties, the relationship between scores was significant. 
Data failed to support the other hypotheses which were derived 
from the combination of Beck's theory of depression and Schachter's 
theory of emotion applied to depression. Beck describes the affective 
state of depression as the consequence of an individual's negative 
interpretation of behavioral or situational cues. Extending Beck's 
theory to Schachter's theory applied to depression, one would conclude 
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that a person may experience arousal and define it as depression because 
of characteristic cognitive sets. Non-significance of results in this 
area can, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that few of the subjects in 
the so-called "depressed" group were clinically depressed according to 
scores on the pretest measure. Of the depressed male subjects, eight 
scores were only one standard deviation above the mean {i.e., T score of 
.50) and two scores were two standard deviations above the mean. Of the 
depressed female subjects, only three scored one standard deviation 
above the mean, the rest scoring less than one standard deviation above 
the mean. This indicates that for the most part, the subjects classi-
fied as trait-depressed experienced relatively low levels of depression. 
Indeed only three subjects reported that they felt depressed enough to 
seek counseling. The DACL scores contributed to this problem as well in 
that more than 60% of the scores were three or less of a possible 12. 
The DACL does not provide sufficiently fine discrimination at such low 
levels of depression as these subjects generally experienced. Future 
research might more profitably use truly depressed subjects in investi-
gations. 
A number of methodological improvements could be made in the 
present study. One possibility is use of other measures. Neither the 
MMPI-D nor the DACL is a factorially pure measure of depression and the 
other factors may be obscuring changes in depressed affect. Additional,;., 
ly, the DACL scores were highly skewed with a modal score of zero. 
Either a more sensitive measure should be used or care should be taken 
to insure that depressed groups are truly depressed and easily discrimi-
nated from non-depressed groups in terms of trait test scores. 
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Another serious problem is found in the biofeedback procedure in 
that it did not produce the desired result of significantly stimulated 
or -quiescent feelings. The measure may have been insensitive since it 
produced a single global subjective r~ting of arousal. A more extensive 
measure tapping various physiological Slfmptoms such as heart rate, 
respiration, etc. separately could be more useful in determining levels 
of arousal. The instructions may not have been convincing enough. In 
future, the exaffiiner might insist, for example, that the subject not eat 
or smoke for several hours before the experiment and be prepared not to 
d.ri ve. or study for several hours afterward. Such instructions would be 
more likely to impress the subject with the efficacy of the "drug" 
he/she is to ingest. An additional problem was that the biofeedback 
procedure was intrinsically soporific and the mazes intrinsically stimu-
lating, thereby obscuring effects of the instructions. This difficulty 
might be overcome by shortening the biofeedback session to reduce bore-
dom. (The feedback session became shorter over the course of this study 
as the examiner became bored with it and as a response to complaints 
from earlier subjects that the audio signal was quite annoying.) Anoth-
er alternative might be to eliminate the biofeedback procedure altogeth-
er and simply administer the placebo with appropriate instructions and 
monitor the subjective level of arousal. An alternative to the mazes 
for producing depression might be a less intrinsically stimulating task 
such as reading sad stories or rating depressing pictures. 
SUMMARY 
This investigation of the relationship between arousal and 
depression attempts to combine Beck's theory of depression and Schach-
ter's theory of emotion as it is applied to depression. Beck theorized 
that one's cognitive schema result in one constructing the experience of 
the self, the world, and the future as negative and thereby causing the 
affective state of depression. Extending Beck's theory to Schachter's 
theory of emotion applied to depression leads to the hypothesis that 
arousal states may be labeled depression on the basis of characteristic 
cognitive sets. 
Measurements of both state and trait depression were used. The 
state depression measure, Lubin's Depression Adjective Check Lists, was 
intended to discriminate temporary changes in mood before and after 
treatment conditions. Beck's Depression Inventory and the MMPI-D scale 
were trait depression measures intended to determine long-term, stable 
tendencies toward depressed affect~ The MMPI-D is well known as one of 
ten scales developed by administering 1000 purposely vague items to 
groups of normal persons and ps.ychiatric patients and eliminating those 
items which were not statistically significant. Reliability and validi-
ty are reasonably high but the MMPI-D does measure other factors besides 
depression. Beck const~ucted his scale from a series of statements 
reflecting s.ymptoms integral to depression and tested them on new 
inpatient and outpatient ps.ychiatric cases. Relaibility and validity 
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are sufficiently high. Lubin gathered a pool of adjectives connoting 
degrees of elation and depression and administered them to groups of 
normal persons and psychiatric patients. Item analysis was employed to 
divide the statistically significant adjectives into lists. Reliability 
and validity are sufficiently high, but the DACL is not a pure measure 
of depression. All three tests correlate significantly. 
Subjects were 20 males and 20 females from introductory psychol-
ogy classes. They were pretested with the MMPI-D and Beck scales and 
half were classified trait-depressed and half non-trait-depressed. The,y 
were administered a placebo described as having stimulant or.quiescent 
effects and a faked biofeedback procedure intended to convince subjects 
that they were indeed feeling stimulated or sedated. Subjects then 
attempted a series of insoluble mazes intended to produce a failure 
experience. The DACL was administered as a pretest, after the feedback 
session, and after the mazes. After the last measure, subjects were 
asked to attempt more mazes as a measure of persistence. Subjects rated 
their arousal four times during the experiment. Data from the DACL, 
persistence, and arousal measures were analyzed by ANOVA with levels of 
depression, type of instructions, and sex as the variables of interest. 
It rras expected that scores on trait and state measures would be 
related. Trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to show in-
creased state depression under stimulant instructions but non-depressed 
individuals would not, nor would either group under quiescent instruc-
tions. Trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to be less persis-
tent than non-trait-depressed individuals. Trait-depressed subjects 
under stimulant instructions were hypothesized to be less persistent 
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than non-depressed subjects under stimulant instructions or either group 
under quiescent instructions. Subjects under stimulant instructions 
were qypothesized to admit more arousal than those under quiescent 
instructions. 
The first dependent variable was the number of dysphoric adjec-
tives endorsed by each subject on the DACL at each of three administra-
tions. High trait-depressed individuals were hypothesized to exhibit 
higher scores on state depression measures than low trait-depressed 
individuals. This qypothesis was supported by a significant main effect. 
High trait-depressed subjects were hypothesized to show increased DACL 
scores under stimulant instructions. Low trait-depressed subjects under 
stimulant instructions would show no change nor would either high or low 
trait-depressed subjects under quiescent instructions. This qypothesis · 
was not supported; the interaction effect was non-significant though in 
the expected direction. No other main effects or interactions were 
found to be significant. 
The second dependent variable was the number of the second set 
of mazes attempted. Subjects with high trait-depression were hypothe-
sized to attempt fewer mazes than those with low trait-depression. This 
hypothesis was not supported by a significant main effect. Depressed 
subjects under stimulant instructions were hypothesized to attempt fewer 
mazes than non-depressed subjects, and under quiescent instructions, the 
depressed and non-depressed groups would not differ in the number of 
mazes attempted. This hypothesis was not supported; the interaction was 
non-significant and not entirely in the expected direction. Under stim-
ulant instructions, depressed subjects attempted fewer mazes than 
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non-depressed subjects as predicted, but under quiescent instructions, 
depressed subjects attempted more mazes than non-depressed subjects, No 
other significant main effects or interactions were found. 
The third dependent variable was the subject's own estimate of 
his arousal. Subjects receiving stimulant instructions were hypothe-
sized to admit to more arousal than subjects receiving quiescent 
instructions. This hypothesis was not supported; the main effect was 
non-significant. Another effect approached significance. Under quies-
cent instructions, depressed subjects reported more arousal than non-
depressed subjects, and under stimulant instructions, depressed subjects 
reported less arousal than non-depressed subjects. 
Data demonstrated a strong relationship between scores on the 
state and trait measures of depression. The state depression measure, 
the DACL, appears to be less responsive to temporary mood changes than 
anticipated, a distinct drawback in this type of study. Neither the 
DACL nor the MMPI-D is a pure measure of depression, tapping other 
factors such as anxiety, hostility, and confusion, but this seems not t9 
have affected this study significantly. 
Data failed to support any hypotheses derived from the combina-
tion of Beck's theory of depression and Schachter's theory of emotion 
applied to depression. Non-significance of results in this area could 
be attributed to the fact that the depressed and non-depressed groups 
were not sufficiently differentiated in terms of MMPI-D and Beck pretest 
scores. For the most part, subjects classified as trait-depressed 
experienced minimal levels of depression. In addition, the DACL scores 
were highly skewed with the modal score of zero. The DACL does not 
provide a fine enough discrimination at such low levels of depression. 
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A number of methodological improvements could be made in the 
present study. More sensitive measures for depression and subjective 
arousal would be appropriate. The use of more severely depressed groups 
would also be appropriate. The biofeedback procedure should be made 
less soporific and the task less arousing. Instructions accompanying 
the placebo could be more convincing. Use of improved procedures in a 
replication should be helpful in determining the strength of trends 
discovered in this study. 
REFERENCES 
Abraham, K. Notes on ps.ychoanalytic investigation and treatment of 
manic-depressive insanity and allied conditions. In Selected 
Papers on Psychoanalysis, New York, Basic Books, 1960. Origi-
nally published 1911. 
Abraham, K. The first pregenital stage of the libido. In Selected 
Papers ~ Psychoanalysis, New York, Basic Books, 1960. Origi-
nally published 1916: 
Abraham, K. A short study of the development of the libido. In Selec-
ted Papers ~ Psychoanal*sis, New York, Basic Books, 1960. 
Originally published 192 • 
Beck, A. Depression. Evanston, Il., Harper & Row, 1967. 
Beck, A. Depressive neurosis, In Arieti, s. (ed.), American Handbook 
of Psychiat:cy, New York, Basic Books, 1974. 
Bibring, E. The mechanism of depression. In Greenacre, P. (ed.), 
Affective Disorders, New York, International University Press,. 
195.3· 
Costello, c. & Comrey, A. Scales for measuring depression and anxiety. 
Journal of Pgrchology, 1967, 66, .30.3-.31.3. 
Dahlstrom, W., Welsh, G., & Dahlstrom, L. An MMPI Handbook. Vol. 1. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota-Press, 1972. 
Dienstbier, R. & Munter, P. Cheating as a function of the labelling of 
natural arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1971, 17, 208-21.). 
Ellis, A. & Harper, R. A New Guide to Rational Living. Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1975· 
Ferster, c. Classification of behavior pathology. In Krasner, L. & 
Ullmann, L. (eds.), Research in Behavior Modification, New York, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1965. 
Frankenhaeuser, M., Jarpe, G., Svan, H., & Wrangsjo, B. 
reactions to two different placebo treatments. 





Frankenhaeuser, M., Post, B., Hagdahl, R., & Wrangsjoe, B. Effects of 
a depressant drug as modified by experimentally-induced expecta-
tions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1964, 18, 513-522. 
Freud, S. Mourning and melancholia. In Jones, E. (ed.), Collected 
Papers, London, Hogarth Press, 1950. Originally published 1917. 
Hathaway, s. & McKinley, J. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
Manual. New York, Psychological Corp., 1967. 
Hill, L. Psychopathology, 1947. Unpublished syllabus cited in Reese, 
w., Profiles of depression, Conditional Reflex, 1971, 3-10. 
Jacobson, E. Contributions to the meta psychology of cyclothymic 
depression. In Greenacre, P. (ed.), Affective Disorders, New 
York, International University Press, 1953· 
Jacobson, E. Transference problems in the ps.rchoanalytic treatment of 
severely depressed patients. Journal of the American Psocchoana-
lytic Association, 1954, 2, 595-606. 
Kanfer, F. The maintenance of behavior by self-generated stimuli and 
reinforcement. In Jacobs, A. & Sachs, L. ( eds.), The P§Ycholog,y 
of Private Events, New York, Academic Press, 1971. 
Kelley, H. Attribution theory in social ps.rchology. Nebraska Symposium 
~Motivation, 1967, 15, 192-238. 
Klein, M. A contribution to the ps.rchogenesis of manic-depressive 
states. In Jones, E. (ed.), Contributions to P§Ychoanalysis, 
London, Hogarth Press, 1948. 
La tan~, B. & Schachter, S. Adrenalin and avoidance learning. Journal 
of Comparative and Physiological Pgycholog,y, 1962, 55, 369-372. 
Lazarus, A. Learning theory and the treatment of depression. Behavior 
Research and Therapy, 1968, 6, 83-89. 
Lewinsohn, P., Shaffer, M., & Libet, J. A behavioral approach to 
depression. Presented at meetings of the American Psychologi-
cal Association, University of Oregon, 1969. 
Lubin, B. Adjective checklists for measurement of depression. Archives 
of General P§Ychiatry, 1965, 12, 57-62. 
Lubin, B. Manual for the DACL. San Diego, Educational and Industrial 
Testing Service,-1967. 
McNair, D. Review of DACL in Buras, 0. (ed.), Seventh Mental Measure-
ments Yearbook, Highland Park, N. J., Gryphon Press, 1972. Vol. 
1. 
Nisbett, R. & Schachter, s. Cognitive manipulation of pain. Journal of 
Experimental Social P§Ychology, 1966, 2, 227-236. 
Patterson, G. & Rosenberry, C. A social learning formulation of depres-
sion. Unpublished study cited in Beck, A., Depressive neurosis, 
in Arieti, s. (ed.), American Handbook of Pgychiatry, New York, 
Basic Books, 1974. 
Rado, s. The problem of melancholia. International Journal of Peycho-
analysis, 1928, 9, 420-438. 
Reese, w. Profiles of depression. Conditional Reflex, 1971, 3-10. 
Schachter, S. The interaction of cognitive and physiological determin-
ants of emotional state. ~n Berkowitz, J. (ed.), Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 1. New York, Academic 
Press, 1964. 
Schachter, S. & Latan~, B. Crime, cognition, and the autonomic nervous 
system. Nebraska Symposium .£!!. Motivation, 1964, 12, 222-27.5. 
Schachter, S. & Singer, J. Cognitive, social and physiological deter-
minants of emotional state. Pgrchological Review, 1962, 69, 
379-399. 
Schachter, S. & Wheeler, L. Epinephrine, chlorpromazine, and amusement. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 6.5, 121-128. 
Singer, J. Sympathetic activation, drugs, and. fear. Journal of Compa-
rative ~ Physiological Pgrchology, 1963, .56, 612-61.5. 
Ullmann, B. & Krasner, L. P! Psychological Approach to Abnormal Behavior. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1969. 
Valins, s. & Ray, A. Effects of cognitive desensitization on avoidance 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social P§Ychology, 1967, 
7, 34.5-3.50. 
Weiss, 1. Clinical aspects of depression. Pgrchoanalytic Quarterly, 
1944, 12, 44.5-461 •. 
Wilkins, w. Psychoanalytic and behavioristic approaches toward depres-
sion: A synthesis? American Journal of P§Ychiatry, 1971, 128, 
138-139· 
Wynne, L. & Solomon, R. Traumatic avoidance learning: Acquisition and 
extinction in dogs deprived of normal peripheral autonomic 
function. General Psychology Monographs, 19.5.5, .52,-241-284. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Letitia Paula Owens has been read and approved 
by the following Committee: 
Dr. Thomas P. Petzel, Chairman 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. James E. Johnson 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and 
the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary 
changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final 
approval by the Committee with reference to content and form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Master of Arts. 
' ' /_7J:f 
Date Director's Signature 
44 
